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Abstract Energy subsidies are causing adverse effects on the economy and environ-
ment stimulating inefficient resource allocation and excessive energy consumption.
Therefore, multiple positive effects are likely to be obtained if subsidies are reduced
or removed completely. This study estimates indirect end-user energy subsidies in
gas and electricity sectors of Ukraine and assesses short-term environmental and so-
cioeconomic effects of a hypothetical elimination of these subsidies. Consumer sub-
sidies are quantified utilizing the price-gap approach that compares end-user prices
and reference prices that would predominate in competitive markets where no sub-
sidies are provided. Input–output analysis is undertaken to investigate impacts in the
short-term. First, a price model is utilized to estimate price changes resulting from
subsidy elimination and then a demand-driven IO model is adopted for estimation of
associated changes of environmental and social variables. As a result of elimination
of energy subsidies, total energy consumption and GHG emissions would decline
by about 2.5 % and 3.6 %, respectively. In addition, distributional effects of a sub-
sidy reform are analyzed utilizing data on consumption patterns of different income
groups.
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1 Introduction
In order to mitigate climate change and accelerate transition toward a more sustain-
able development path, massive investments are required for energy efficient and re-
newable energy technologies. Instead, large amounts of money are spent annually
to stimulate production and consumption of conventional energy. Governments pro-
vide support either explicitly through subsidies or implicitly through interventions in
energy prices and fuel allocation. Theoretically, subsidies could be justified if they
increase overall social welfare. However, fossil-fuel subsidies are seen as having a
net negative effect since they distort the economy and stimulate environmental dete-
rioration (Ellis 2010). Although in OECD countries energy subsidies have decreased
considerably over the past two decades, subsidies are still pervasive in developing
countries and transition economies (UNEP 2004).
Direct state support for energy sectors is not large in Ukraine compared to very
high implicit subsidies due to under-pricing of energy products. Gas, electricity, and
district heating tariffs for households are set by the state at very low rates, which do
not reflect full costs for maintenance and capital investments (IEA 2006b). Under-
pricing of energy distorts the economy of Ukraine and is one of the most important
factors of its persistently high energy-intensity. As of 2009, it was at the level of
0.40 Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES)/GDP (ppp) (toe per 1000 USD at 2000
prices) compared to 0.37 for non-OECD Europe and Eurasia and a world average
of 0.19TPES/GDP (ppp) (IEA 2011a). Energy consumption is also responsible for a
large share of GHG emissions of the country. In particular, GHG emissions from fuel
combustion amounted to 240.6 million tons CO2-eq., i.e., 57 % of the total country
emissions in 2008 (MENR 2010).
In the early 1990s, GHG emissions of the country had fallen drastically as a result
of the collapse of the Soviet Union and resultant crash of the national economy with a
GDP drop of about 50 % (SSCU 2009a) in 1995 compared to 1990 levels. Neverthe-
less, Ukraine is among the top 20 largest CO2 emitters in the world (United Nations
Statistics Division 2010), with one of the highest carbon intensities of 0.89 kg CO2-
eq/GDP (PPP), which is slightly higher than for non-OECD Europe and Eurasia, but
almost twice as large as the world average (IEA 2011a).
Since the mid-1990s, the economy has gradually recovered and GHG emissions
have started to rise. However, in situations of frequent political instability and heavy
economic and social problems, environmental issues and climate change in particular
are far from being a priority on the political agenda.
A number of modeling studies show evidence that reduction or elimination of en-
ergy subsidies could bring environmental and economic gains (for a good review, see
Ellis 2010). Similarly, the IEA (1999) suggests that elimination of energy subsidies
is likely to address all three dimensions of sustainable development. Environmental
benefits would be obtained through efficient pricing leading to reductions of envi-
ronmental pollution. Social welfare could be improved by redirecting public funds
spent on subsidies toward social needs. Economic advantages could be derived from
increased efficiency of resource allocation and reduced public expenditures.
A number of studies have been undertaken to estimate environmental and
economic impacts of phasing out energy subsidies in developing and transition
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economies (e.g., Saboochi 2001; Saunders and Schneider 2000; Lin and Jiang 2011).
However, according to our knowledge, no papers have previously analyzed the likely
effects of the removal of end-user energy subsidies (i.e., energy price distortions) for
the Ukrainian context. In addition, conclusions derived for Ukraine could also be rel-
evant for other transition economies since the majority of post-Soviet countries inher-
ited highly energy-intensive economies due to relative abundance of energy resources
in the Soviet Union and state control of energy prices. Therefore, the objective of this
study is to estimate end-user energy subsidies in gas and electricity sectors of Ukraine
and assess environmental and socioeconomic effects of a hypothetical elimination of
energy subsidies.
The paper does not consider direct subsidies (i.e., direct payments made by the
government) either to consumers or producers but focuses on implicit consumer
subsidies following the definition and approach of the International Energy Agency
(1999). We adopted a broad definition of energy subsidies as any government policies
or measures could directly or indirectly influence prices or costs. These subsidies are
estimated as a price-gap between actual prices and market prices, which would pre-
vail in the absence of subsidies. In this paper, we focus only on consumer subsidies
in electricity and gas sectors. Indirect consumer subsidies for the oil and coal sector
are not considered since previous studies have shown that prices of oil products are
close to market levels and consumer subsidies for coal did not take place in Ukraine
(e.g., IEA 2006a, 2008, 2011b).
Section 2 provides an overview of the previous estimates of energy subsidies in
Ukraine and reviews the literature for environmental and socioeconomic effects of
a hypothetical subsidy reform. Section 3 elucidates theoretical underpinnings of the
price-gap approach and input–output analysis, describes the data utilized in the anal-
ysis, and points out limitations of this paper. Section 4 presents the main findings
of the study. Finally, conclusions and policy implications of the hypothetical energy
subsidy reform are summarized in Sect. 5.
2 An Overview of Previous Estimates of Energy Subsidies in Ukraine and
Impact Assessments of Removal of Subsidies
First estimations of energy subsidies for developing countries and economies in tran-
sition are dating back to the 1990s. For example, the pioneering study by Larsen and
Shah (1992) estimated energy subsidies in the countries of the former Soviet Union
amounting to 172 billion USD. However, only few estimates have been carried specif-
ically for Ukraine. Perhaps, the first one and the most detailed to date is the case study
prepared by Petri et al. (2002) that computed quasi-fiscal activities in gas and elec-
tricity sectors being equal to 6.5 % of GDP in 2000. Saavalainen and Berge (2006)
calculated the quasi-fiscal deficit for the same sectors as being 5.3 % and 3.1 % of
GDP, respectively. Legeida (2001) analyzed both explicit and implicit subsidies in
Ukraine’s economy in 2000. IEA (2006a, 2008) calculated consumer energy subsi-
dies from under-pricing for the 20 largest non-OECD countries. According to IEA’s
estimates, in Ukraine subsidies for gas consumption reached about 12 billion USD in
2005 and 10 billion USD in 2007. Subsidies for electricity were significantly lower,
2.5 billion USD in 2005 and around 4 billion USD in 2007.
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Estimation of macroeconomic effects of energy price shocks is an important and a
well-established field of research; numerous studies have been carried out to investi-
gate effects of steep increases of energy prices at the international and regional level
as well as for individual countries (e.g., Bohi 1991; IEA 2004; Lardic and Mingnon
2006; Nasseh and Elyasiani 1984; World Bank 2005). The gas conflict between Rus-
sia and Ukraine in 2006 and resultant abrupt price increase of imported gas stimulated
research on the effects of energy price shocks on Ukraine’s economy. For example,
the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER) in Ukraine (2006)
estimated, using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, that an increase
of the gas price by 60 % triggered by a sharp price increase of imported gas could
result in an annual 5.5 % decline of real GDP and about a 20 % decrease of total
welfare in the medium-term (about 7–10 years) after the economy has fully adjusted
to the external price shock. Chemical industry and metallurgy are expected to be the
most vulnerable with about 80 % decline of aggregate output. It has been estimated
that in order to mitigate the effect of a large price increase, i.e., prevent the drop of
real GDP, domestic gas consumption should be reduced by 36 %, which equals a
12 % decline of the energy-intensity of the economy. Another study by IER (2007)
has shown that energy market reforms coupled with investment in energy efficiency
and expansion of domestic gas production could counteract negative effects of energy
price shocks. In particular, an approximate three times increase of the domestic price
of gas and about 2 times for electricity and heat could reduce total primary energy
supply (TPES) by about 50 % over a 10-year time horizon.
A World Bank (2005) study utilized a simple Net Import Model to quantify short-
term effects of oil and gas price shocks on Ukraine’s economy. Depending on the
scenarios employed, GDP would decline within the range of 0.4–8.6 % for the first
year of the price shock and 0.2–6 % of GDP during the second year. Flanagan et al.
(2007) used statistical modeling to quantify effects of a 10 % increase in the import
price of gas over the short and medium-term period. In the near term (1 year), output
could decline from 0.09 % to 0.43 % (depending on the method) and inflation could
increase by up to 1.17 %. Mid-term effects on output would be higher (from 0.47 %
to 0.50 %) while inflation rate could decrease to 1.06 %.
In spite of all modeling estimates, Ukraine’s economy has proven to be more re-
silient to external price shocks than expected. GDP growth remained positive in 2006
and even counteracted declining tendencies recorded in 2005 (Pirani 2007). The au-
thor notes that the main reasons for this are high prices of exporting products, partic-
ularly metals, energy efficiency improvements, and consumption-induced growth of
the economy.
Historically, energy subsidies have been introduced to ameliorate important social
issues; however, it might not have been the most efficient method to address them.
The only case when energy subsidies could be justified is when increasing energy
production and consumption beyond economically efficient levels is the only possible
way to achieve important policy targets, which is very difficult to prove in reality. In
fact, direct transfer of funds could be a more efficient approach to deal with social
problems than subsidizing energy consumption (IEA 1999). For example, Kebede
(2006) examined the effectiveness of energy subsidies for kerosene and electricity in
Ethiopia and came to the conclusion that subsidies benefit more nonpoor households
than low income groups.
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Similar to carbon pricing policies, removal of subsidies is likely to have negative
distribution effects (Feng et al. 2010; Kerkhof et al. 2008) since low income groups
are usually spending a larger share of their income on utilities, which would increase
prices considerably if gas and electricity subsidies are abolished. A number of stud-
ies were carried out previously to examine distributional effects of energy subsidy
reform in developing countries (Gangopadhyay et al. 2005; Kebede 2006; Parvin and
Banouei 2009; Soheir et al. 2009). For example, Saboohi (2001) found evidence that
negative effects could be minimized and net income of the poor in Iran could even
increase if the energy subsidy reform is accompanied by a mechanism of recycling
back of some revenues to lower income households.
A limited amount of literature is available on the affordability of basic utility ser-
vices and susceptibility of price increases for low-income households in transition
countries (e.g., Fankhauser and Tepic 2007; Fankhauser et al. 2008; Lampietti et al.
2001; Lampietti and Meyer 2002; Lovei et al. 2000). Dodonov et al. (2004) examined
vulnerability of poor households in Ukraine to increases of electricity tariffs and came
to conclusion that adjusting electricity prices up to cost-covering levels estimated by
the National Electricity Regulation Commission (NERC) would not cause consider-
able welfare losses for households. However, the authors claim that further increases
up to the average OECD levels, to reflect long-run marginal production costs, could
have adverse social consequences and should be implemented in a stepwise fashion.
Elimination of subsidies is the initial step for establishing the level of emissions
at the “socially optimal level” with the subsequent implementation of carbon pricing
policies aiming to internalize externalities (World Bank 1997). However, in situations
when energy prices simply do not reflect opportunity costs or long-run marginal pro-
duction costs in developing countries and economies in transition, phasing out en-
ergy subsidies alone could be perceived as effective climate mitigation policy. Since
energy consumption and GHG emissions are intrinsically coupled, a price-induced
decrease of energy use would eventually result in reduction of GHG emissions. For
example, Burniaux et al. (2009) estimated using the OECD ENV-Linkages model
that gradual elimination of subsidies over the period from 2013 to 2020 (assuming
no other mitigation policies are taken) would result in a ∼20 % reduction in CO2
emissions in Russia and other non-EU Eastern European countries.
3 Methodology
3.1 Price-Gap Approach
The underlying presumption of the price-gap approach is that energy subsidies de-
crease prices of energy goods and services, thereby, leading to increase in consump-
tion. The “price gap” is the difference between final consumer prices and reference
prices that would dominate in competitive markets where no subsidies are provided to
either consumers or producers (IEA 1999). Theoretical underpinnings of the method-
ology were developed by Corden (1957). Larsen and Shah (1992) applied the price-
gap approach for quantification of global fossil-fuel consumption subsidies. Later,
the method was used by the IEA (1999, 2006a, 2006b, 2008) for estimation of energy
subsidies in the largest non-OECD countries.
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The price-gap approach is described in detail by IEA (1999). The basic idea to
compare end-user energy prices with reference prices is very simple; however, prac-
tical application of the method is less straightforward since some assumptions need
to be made for calculation of reference prices. End-user prices correspond to actual
energy prices paid by final consumers. These prices reflect current energy pricing
policy of a country and incorporate all taxes and fees as well as reductions and re-
bates imposed on energy products and services. Reference prices indicate the prices
at undistorted market and reflect full opportunity cost of energy consumption. Either
international market prices or long-run marginal cost of production could be used
as a benchmark for reference prices of energy products. For traded goods, the ref-
erence price is calculated based on the export or import border price, for nontraded
products, production cost forms the basis. Importantly, border price and domestic
production cost should be equal to an ‘ideal’ competitive market. Domestic produc-
tion cost should be estimated based at the international price even if the product
could be produced domestically at the lower cost (OECD 2010). Internal transporta-
tion and distribution costs are also incorporated in the reference price. In addition,
Value Added Tax (VAT) and other country-specific general transaction taxes should
be included. These taxes “are part of the cost of doing business” and do not influence
comparative prices between energy products and other goods, and hence, economic
efficiency of resource allocation (p. 76 in IEA 1999). However, energy taxes should
not be used for calculation of reference prices since they partly offset subsidy-induced
effects on final prices and consumption. Therefore, subsidies for final energy and gas
consumers in Ukraine are calculated utilizing the following equation:
Sc = Q(Pr − P) (1)
where Sc is defined as consumer subsidies for gas or electricity, P—end-user price
including subsidies, Pr—estimated reference price excluding subsidies and Q—total
consumption of gas or electricity. Final prices are differentiated depending on the
consumer group, quantity of energy consumed (the price increases with higher en-
ergy consumption), and availability of meters. Since energy consumption data for
each group of consumers (with different energy consumption and with or without
meters) is not available at a very detailed (price differentiation) level, it was decided
to compare actual cost, reported by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy (MFE 2009) and
estimated reference cost for a given quantity of energy consumed. Thus, Eq. (1) could
be presented in the following way:
Sc = Cr − Ca (2)
where Ca = PQ is defined as actual cost of gas or electricity consumed at the cur-
rent end-user prices reported by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine (MFE
2009) and Cr = PrQ is defined as cost in an undistorted market. Reference price and
cost for gas is estimated based on the price of imported gas and adjusted for trans-
portation and distribution costs and 20 % value added tax (VAT). A special surcharge
coefficient on the gas price is also included since it works not as classical energy
tax levied on energy to reduce energy consumption or emissions. On the contrary,
the revenues generated by the surcharge are used for gasification of new territories
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and compensation of the losses of Naftogaz (holding the largest share of the oil and
gas market in Ukraine) from selling gas to district heating companies. Therefore, the
surcharge contributes to full costs of the product and investment needs, which should
be included in prices of all goods and services. Hence, the surcharge does not distort
relative prices between energy products and other goods. A special surcharge coeffi-
cient1 is used as a coefficient on cost of gas excluding transportation and distribution
tariffs and VAT. The duty aiming to compensate expenditures of Naftogaz on selling
gas to households has also been included for the same reasons. Therefore, reference
cost of gas, Crg (in Ukrainian Hryvnia, UAH) is expressed as
Crg = Qg(Pim + Cs + Ttg + Tdg)(1+ VAT) + SsQg(Pim + Cs) (3)
where Qg is total consumption of gas (in 1000 m3), Pim (in UAH per 1000 m3) is
the price of gas at the border, Cs (in UAH per 1000 m3)—cost of selling gas incurred
by Naftogaz, Ss—special surcharge coefficient; Ttg and Tdg transportation and distri-
bution tariffs (in UAH per 1000 m3), respectively. In 2008, the price of imported gas
was at 945.5 UAH per 1000 m3 which approximately equals 179.5 USD.2 Average
2008 values of other price components provided by the National Electricity Regu-
lation Commission (NERC 2009) and Ministry of Fuel and Energy (2009) are used
in estimates. Since Ukraine less actively participates in electricity trade (about 4 %
is exported according to NERC 2009) with other countries compared to other types
of energy, long-term production cost is a more appropriate benchmark for estimation
of subsidies than the export border price. According to NERC (2009), the wholesale
market price (for suppliers) reflects all operational costs and incorporates surcharge
for some investments. However, current tariffs are not high enough to compensate for
depreciation and investment needs in nuclear, hydro, and most thermal power plants
(IEA 2006b). According to the Energy Strategy of Ukraine (MFE 2006), the electric-
ity sector requires around 196 billion UAH (37 billion USD) of investment during
the period from 2006 to 2010, which means approximately 39 billion UAH (7 billion
USD) annually. MFE (2009) reports that about 5 billion UAH (0.95 billion USD) of
capital investment have been utilized by the energy sector from all sources (including
surcharge) in 2008. Hence, investment deficit amounted to around 34 billion UAH
(6.5 billion USD) or 0.27 UAH/kWh (0.05 USD/kWh) for approximately 125 billion
kWh of electricity consumed in 2008 (MFE 2009). Therefore, prices should be in-
creased by about 0.27 UAH/kWh in order to reflect long-run production costs. This
approach is especially relevant because the government perceives optimization of the
price and tariff policy as one of the most important mechanisms of investment in the
energy sector (MFE 2006). In addition, the wholesale price should be first adjusted
to eliminate cross-subsidization of households by industrial consumers. The price
used in calculations is reduced by 23.7 % (proportion of cross-subsidization) (NERC
2009). Therefore, reference cost of electricity Cre (in UAH) is calculated as follows:
Cre = Qe(Pw + Id + Tte + Tse)(1+ VAT) (4)
1Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine N 442 as of 11 June 2005 on the special surcharge on gas
tariff.
2Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine N 163 as of 5 March 2008 on selling imported natural gas in
Ukraine.
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where Qe—total electricity consumed (in kWh), Pw—wholesale price for suppliers
(in UAH/kWh), Id—investment deficit (in UAH/kWh), Tte and Tse—transmission
and supply tariffs for electricity (in UAH/kWh). Average 2008 prices and tariffs in the
electricity sector published by National Electricity Regulation Commission (NERC
2009) are used in the estimates.
Despite the fact that price-gap metric is widely applied for cross-country studies
(e.g., Burniaux et al. 1992; IEA 1999; Larsen and Shah 1992), due to its relative
simplicity and low level of data requirements, it has a number of important limitations
described by Koplow (2009) and IEA (1999).
3.2 Estimating Price Effects on Environmental and Socioeconomic Factors
3.2.1 Input–Output (IO) Price Model
Input–output analysis is carried out for estimation of environmental and socioeco-
nomic effects from phasing-out energy subsidies in the gas and electricity sectors of
Ukraine. We have chosen IO approach because it is a well established and the most
transparent methodology appropriate for addressing research questions set in this pa-
per. As demonstrated in Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997), input–output models can be
regarded as simplified general equilibrium models or satisfactory approximation to
general equilibrium models when the modeling focus is on short-term analyses of
one-shot policy shocks like the price-gap elimination specified in this paper. In ad-
dition, this study utilizes both the demand-driven and price IO model to establish
the link between changes of relative prices and quantities of goods demanded, thus
incorporating the essence of a CGE model without burdening itself with the com-
plex and data-demanding work of constructing a fully fledged CGE model. While
a CGE model is capable of assessing structural and technological change effects of
policy shocks, this study argues that it is important to study short-run consequences
for the purpose of developing mitigation strategies as unwillingness to encounter ad-
ditional costs usually impedes necessary policy reforms. Another advantage of the
IO methodology is that it allows explicitly examining industry interdependency, in
the case of this research, how elimination of subsidies in gas and electricity sectors
triggers changes in other sectors.
The study builds on the dual nature of the input–output system and utilizes both
the demand-driven and price IO model. In addition, partial equilibrium analysis is
incorporated within an IO framework to establish the link between changes of relative
prices and quantities of goods demanded.
The Leontief price model is the starting point of the analysis. The model reflects
that the total price of one unit of output is equal to total costs of its production in-
cluding intermediate purchases and primary inputs. Thus, the basic equation of the
Leontief price model is usually expressed as follows:
p′ = v′(I − A)−1 = v′L (5)
where p′ is a row vector of prices of produced commodities by each sector and v′
denotes a row vector of primary inputs per one monetary unit of price; I is the identity
matrix; (I − A)−1 is the Leontief inverse L or total requirements matrix.
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This study adopts the IO price model for estimation of changes in relative prices
as a result of elimination of implicit subsidies in electricity and gas sectors. This
will lead to price increases of commodities of other sectors, which require gas and
electricity for production and resources from other sectors which, in turn, purchase
energy as intermediate inputs. Thus, the final change of relative prices is caused by
direct and indirect effects of price increases for energy. A price shock caused by
phasing out subsidies in gas and electricity sectors could be recorded as a change of
value-added of these sectors. Therefore, relative changes of prices for a change in
primary inputs could be estimated as follows:
p′ = v′L (6)
wherev′ is a row vector of changes in the primary inputs andp′ is a vector of price
changes. In other words, similar to an imposition of a tax, elimination of consumer
subsidies for gas and electricity is recorded as a change of value added, v′, for
sectors in oil and gas extraction and electricity production, respectively, to estimate
resultant price changes, p′, and distributional effects (see Eq. (7)).
3.2.2 Estimating CPI Changes for Different Income Groups
The input–output price model is also used to quantify welfare impacts of energy
subsidies reform utilizing data on consumption patterns of households classified per
income level (from the lowest income, 1st group, to the highest, 11th group) and by
area of residence, in particular, households living in rural areas and in urban areas
(SSCU 2009b).
We adopt a fairly standard Laspeyres price index (see, e.g., ILO 2004), which
assumes a fixed structure of goods and services, to estimate a change of the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) or additional income required for purchasing the same basket of





where CPIh refers to the change in consumer price index (in %), h indexes house-
holds with different income levels and areas of residence, and βhj is the budget share
of commodity j for each group of households—h, reported by State Statistics Com-
mittee of Ukraine (SSCU 2009b), and pj is a relative price change (in %) of each
sector’s commodity j estimated with Eq. (6). Subscript j denotes the element in col-
umn of the matrix.
A time horizon is not explicitly defined in this paper. Since technological change
is not foreseen in the methodology adopted and direct input coefficients remain con-
stant, only short-term effects are studied assuming that the economy does not have
time for structural adjustment and substitution between energy and nonenergy factors
of production.
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3.2.3 Partial Equilibrium Approach
The underlying assumption of the price model is that changes in value added lead to
changes in relative prices of goods and services but the quantities of goods demanded
remain constant. However, economic theory suggests that in response to higher prices
on normal goods, i.e., decrease in real income, rational consumers would either re-
duce purchases of given commodities, substitute for the cheaper ones or maintain the
same level of consumption at the expense of other products. Therefore, we aim to
estimate the response of final consumers to increased prices of goods and services.
At the same time, industries are unable to adjust their input structure as technical
coefficients are fixed in the input–output model. This is one of the most important
limitations of the IO methodology, but still consistent in the short run since industries
are unable to change technological processes immediately and would need more time
and additional investments. Thus, we assume that all costs will be passed on to final
consumers, which are more capable of responding to price shocks in the short run.
Households have a number of measures available which could be relatively easily
implemented to mitigate rapid increase of utilities tariffs. At the moment, residential
energy consumption in Ukraine is about 250–275 kWh/m2 compared to 120 kWh/m2
in Western Europe (World Bank 2012). Moreover, 80 % of buildings do not even have
heat meters installed (IEA 2012). It is estimated that heat meters installation could
reduce heat consumption by 15–25 % decreasing heating costs by about 10–15 %
(World Bank 2012). Water consumption by households is also very high in Ukraine
compared to the EU countries. The main reason for this is that water supply tariffs
are very low and do not even cover operational costs in the majority of the regions.
In addition, tariffs are based on weighted average rather than actual consumption
and most of households do not have water meters installed (see, e.g., EBRD 2011;
OECD 2007).
A partial equilibrium approach is used to establish the link between price changes
estimated by price model with changes in final demand derived from the classical de-
mand driven model. The basic relationship between changes of prices and quantities




where ε is the price elasticity of final demand for output, P and Q initial price and
quantity and P and Q are changes of prices and quantity. A change of quantity




notation (9) in matrix algebra is expressed as
y = −pˆεˆy0 (10)
where y0 is the initial vector of final demand, y, column vector of change in final
demand, pˆ diagonal matrix (a matrix with the elements of the vector in the main
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Table 1 Price elasticities of
demand for output Economic sectors Price elasticities
Forestry −0.5
Agriculture and Fishing −0.2
Coal mining −0.2
Oil and gas extraction −0.2
Mining of non-energy materials −0.2
Food −0.2
Textiles −0.7
Pulp and paper −0.7
Manufacture of coke and petroleum −0.7
Chemicals and plastics −0.7






Hot water supply −0.2
Water purification and distribution −0.2
Construction −0.7
Trade and repair −0.7








diagonal and zeros in outside the main diagonal) of price changes (in % or share of
unity) and εˆ diagonal matrix of elasticities. In other words, we diagonalize the vector
of price changes p′ (obtained with Eq. (6)) to receive a diagonal matrix pˆ and use
y0, initial vector of final demand recorded in the IO table, and εˆ diagonal matrix of
elasticities (see Table 1) to estimate a change in final demand, y, which is then used
in subsequent steps of the analysis.
Unfortunately, consistent estimates of price elasticities for most commodities are
often not available. There are numerous studies on price sensitivity of energy con-
sumption showing energy consumption likely to be relatively inelastic in the short-
run since few substitution options are available for households (e.g., Cohn 1980;
Prosser 1985; Bentzen and Engsted 1993; Bernstein and Griffin 2006). Atakhanova
and Howie (2007) estimated short and long-run price-elasticity of residential electric-
ity consumption as of −0.22 and −1.10. Nahata et al. (2007) obtained comparable re-
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sults for urban and rural households in Russia. Some research has been carried out on
demand sensitivity of agricultural commodities and food products to price changes,
which are also likely to be inelastic in the short-term (e.g., Andrikopoulos et al. 1987;
Russo et al. 2008) and transportation services (Wohlgemuth 1997). However, it is es-
pecially difficult to find elasticities for certain industries, especially, for effects in the
short-run. Considering limited availability of real estimates of price sensitivity for all
economic sectors, Ho et al. (2008) derived elasticities from a macroeconomic model
for the US under constrained conditions; Choi et al. (2010) adopted assumptions on
several scenarios for price elasticities. This study assumes that similar sectors would
have similar price elasticities (see Table 1). This assumption was made due to lim-
ited evidence from the literature (e.g., Atakhanova and Howie 2007; Ho et al. 2008;
Nahata 2007; Russo 2008; Wohlgemuth 1997).
3.2.4 Input–Output Demand-Driven Model
At the next stage of analysis, the classical Leontief (see, e.g., Miller and Blair 2009)
IO model is utilized to estimate demand-induced changes of the total output and as-
sociated changes of employment, total energy, and gas consumption and GHG emis-
sions.
A change of total output x as a result of change in final demand y (calculated
with Eq. (10)) is estimated as
x = (I − A)−1y = Ly (11)
A decrease in gross outputs would result in decline in resource consumption, emis-
sions or other factors. The IO model is extended to examine these effects as well.
Similar to the coefficients in the A matrix, physical coefficients bi are calculated by




Subscript i denotes the element in row of the matrix. From (12), a change in output
x (estimated with Eq. (11)) would result in a change of environmental and socioe-
conomic factors and could be calculated as
e = bˆx (13)
where e is a vector of change in resource inputs or emissions, bˆ is the diagonal
matrix of physical coefficients.
3.3 Data
The most recent input–output table for Ukraine, available for 2008 is used in this
study (SSCU 2010). In the columns of the table, industry sectors are classified ac-
cording to Ukrainian statistical classification of economic activities, which was de-
veloped based on classification of economic activities in the European Community
(NACE). Classification of commodities and services (in rows of the table) is in line
Journal of Economic Structures (2013) 2:7 Page 13 of 27
















Interindustry transactions Z y x E′
Value added v′
Total outlays x′
with state classification of commodities and services based on European Classifica-
tion of Products by Activity (CPA).
The table consists of 38 sectors, 6 of which refer to energy goods and services,
11 manufacturing industries and construction, 16 service sectors, 2 transport sectors
and communications, 3 sectors capture activities in agriculture, fishing and forestry.
Table 2 illustrates interindustry transactions between sectors (Z), final demand for
each industry’s outputs (x) is reflected in the column vector y and v′ refers to primary
inputs required by each sector. Value added part of the table incorporates wages for
employees, profits, taxes, and subsidies on production. In addition to final deliveries
to households, government and nonprofit institutions, the “use” section of the table
provides data on gross capital formation and net exports.
The table is augmented by additional columns in physical units to account for ef-
fects on GHG emissions, employment, total energy and gas consumption by each
sector utilizing the data published by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine
(2009a, 2009b, 2009c) and GHG emissions inventory of Ukraine (MENR 2010).
Since the level of detail for each examined variable is different, the table has been
aggregated to complement the data on environmental and socioeconomic factors. In
particular, the table was aggregated to 13 economic sectors to complement GHG
emissions data available and to 28 sectors to study effects on energy consumption
and employment.
3.4 Limitations
It is important to note that obtained results should be treated with caution because
of the data caveats associated with this study and inherent limitations of the methods
used. First of all, the accuracy of obtained results depends on the quality of the data
used in the model. National income accounts always have a “residual error,” which is
the difference of GDP estimates according to two of three possible conventions (Per-
man et al. 2003). Secondly, input–output models embody a number of simplifying
assumptions, which should be considered carefully while interpreting obtained re-
sults. However, those assumptions are transparent and mathematically traceable. One
of the most important shortcomings of the input–output analytical framework is that
technical coefficients and the coefficients of physical factors, e.g., GHG emissions
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and energy inputs do not change as a result of energy subsidy induced price changes.
In other words, there are no substitution responses to increased prices of energy in-
puts. At the same time, price elasticities of demand are incorporated in the study
design to allow for adjustment of quantities of goods consumed to price changes.
Ho et al. (2008) argue that this approach could be intrinsically inconsistent since the
response of final consumers to higher prices is taken into an account while produc-
ers are not able to switch to less energy intensive inputs. Therefore, an assumption
is made that all additional costs to producers are passed on to final consumers. In
addition, Perman et al. (2003) note that, in reality, higher energy prices would result
in consumption of less energy per unit of output and less energy-intensive intermedi-
ate inputs, which in turn would decrease prices. Thus, the input–output price model
sets up the upper margins to price changes which would eventually occur. More-
over, there are some other important limitations of using input–output analysis. In
particular, price changes would also affect investment decisions and labor inputs,
which are not taken into account (Ho et al. 2008). Nevertheless, assumptions of the
approach are consistent with the short-term time framework adopted in the analy-
sis. In other words, the impacts of subsidy reform are estimated before the economy
has adjusted for price changes assuming that there is no time for structural changes
and substitution of labor and capital for energy as well as cross-substitution of fuels.
Technological change and cross-substitution between energy and nonenergy factors
of production could be explicitly modeled with (CGE) models, which on the other
hand introduce other model-immanent problems (see, e.g., Clarete and Roumasset
1986; Scrieciu 2007). Other methodological limitations are highlighted in the analy-
sis section since they are important for interpretation of estimates obtained.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Energy Subsidies in the Gas and Electricity Sectors of Ukraine
We evaluated consumer subsidies for gas and electricity sectors utilizing the price
gap approach, which is described in detail in the Methodology section. Estimated
reference prices that would prevail in an “ideal” market (where all subsidies are elim-
inated) are significantly higher than current prices for gas and electricity (see Table 3).
Retail gas prices for households and district heating companies constitute only
26 % and 57 % of the reference price, respectively. In comparison, current prices for
industry and state-funded institutions are equal to 81 % of the reference price because
tariffs for these consumer groups are based on the import gas price. It is important
to note that the estimate is highly sensitive to the import border price. The price of
Russian gas for Ukraine is indexed to prices of oil products at the global market and
also depends on the political situation between two countries. Hence, it is likely that
the gas price will continue to grow in the future and domestic gas tariffs should be
increased in line with import gas prices to prevent price distortions in the domestic
market.
Electricity prices for all consumer groups are significantly lower than the reference
price. Tariffs should be increased by about two times the current level for nonresi-
dential consumers and almost three times for households in order to reflect long-run
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Table 3 Comparison of actual (average for 2008) and reference prices for gas and electricity
Consumer group Gas sectora





Reference price Average end-user
prices
Reference price
Households 372.7 1431.6 243.6 615.7
State-funded institutions 1165.1 –
District heating companies 826.4 332.9
Industry 1165.1 332.9
Source: own estimates
a1 UAH = 0.19 USD, average in 2008 (National Bank of Ukraine 2011)
production cost. Interestingly, the estimated reference price is still lower than the
electricity tariffs for households in most EU countries. In particular, the reference
price of 615.7 UAH/MWh equals 0.064 EUR/kWh. In comparison, the lowest elec-
tricity tariff for households (at annual consumption 3500 kWh) was in Latvia, 0.068
EUR/kWh, and the highest in Italy, 0.268 EUR/kWh as of July, 2010 (Europe’s En-
ergy Portal 2010).
Following the price-gap approach described in the Methodology section (see Eqs.
(1)–(4)), we found that implicit subsidies at 2008-consumption levels amounted to
almost 26 billion UAH (5 billion USD) in the gas sector and approximately 24 bil-
lion UAH (4.6 billion USD) in the electricity sector. It should be noted that estimates
obtained represent a lower margin for subsidies in the sector since underpriced fuel
inputs such as gas and coal are not taken into an account. Interestingly, IEA (2011b)
estimates of subsidies differ significantly (8.27 billion USD and 1.51 billion USD for
gas and electricity sector, respectively). Although the study adopted the IEA method-
ology (1999, 2006a, 2006b, 2008), obtained results are not directly comparable with
estimates provided in the Fossil fuel subsidy database (IEA 2011b) because it is not
clear what assumptions have been used for estimation of the reference prices.
End-user subsidies in gas and electricity sectors are equal to 2.7 % and 2.6 % of the
GDP, respectively, and cumulatively comparable to approximately 16 % of the state
budget.3 However, it is essential to point out that these estimates do not reflect direct
state transfers to the energy sector and only capture market interventions resulted in
decreased prices for final consumers. In comparison, direct financial support to oil
and gas extraction sector and electricity production recorded in the IO table roughly
equals 2.2 billion UAH (0.4 billion USD) and 1.3 billion UAH (0.3 billion USD),
respectively (SSCU 2010).
4.2 Effects on Relative Prices, Production and Employment
This study explores effects of rapid price rises for gas and electricity as a result of
a hypothetical elimination of implicit subsidies in these sectors. In fact, this would
3In 2008, GDP was at the level of 949864 million UAH (180336 million USD) and budget expenditure
was 312018 million UAH (59238 million USD) (SSCU 2009a).
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Fig. 1 Increase of relative prices for different economic sectors
lead to a fourfold increase of the gas price for households to reflect true opportunity
cost of domestically produced gas and an increase of the electricity price of around
three times to ensure compensation for long-run production costs. It is important to
note, however, that these scenarios are hypothetical and the government is advised to
increase prices gradually to mitigate negative economic and social effects. Unlike the
IER (2006, 2007) studies, this paper investigates short-term effects of price shocks
assuming that economy does not have enough time to allow for restructuring and
substitution between energy and nonenergy factors of production. It is estimated that
price increases for gas and electricity of 1.43 UAH per m3 (0.27 USD per m3) and
0.62 UAH/kWh (0.12 USD/kWh) would more than double relative prices for some
industries while prices of others are not considerably affected. Interestingly, prices
in oil and gas extraction and electricity production sectors have increased less than
in some other industries. Figure 1 illustrates the increase in relative prices for most
affected sectors (see Additional file 1, Table A.1 for breakdown of price changes for
all sectors). A group of sectors in supply and distribution of gas, electricity, and water
are likely to experience the highest increase of relative prices. This could be explained
by large input requirements for gas and electricity per unit of output. Assuming that
all price shocks are passed on to final consumers, relative prices of services of the
water purification and distribution, for example, would rise by about 40 % and about
180 %, respectively, as a result of price hikes in gas and electricity sectors. Other
highly impacted sectors are forestry, mining of nonenergy materials and several man-
ufacturing sectors, particularly the manufacture of coke products and manufacture of
other nonmetallic mineral products.
Steep price increases for commodities of different sectors are likely to enforce
knock-on effects on final demand for these products since consumers would seek
to minimize their losses by introducing energy saving measures or switching to less
energy-intensive goods. However, demand sensitivity is likely to be inelastic in the
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Fig. 2 Decline of production for different economic sectors
short-term for most sectors. We found that examined price shocks could cumula-
tively result in reduction of total final demand by about 2.5 % or around 18.7 billion
UAH (3.6 billion USD) (see Additional file 1, Table A.1 for results for all sectors).
Assuming that investment and net exports do not change in the short-run a phasing
out subsidies in the gas and electricity sectors could result in a decline of GDP by
about 1.35 % and 0.62 %, respectively, relative to 2008 level. It should be noted that
higher energy prices could bring higher revenues to the government in the form of
tax payments. However, this effect may be counteracted by reduced consumption and
production; in case the former effect will prevail and government revenue will still
increase. For simplicity, this analysis assumes that the excess money will be spent to
reduce foreign debt of Ukraine rather than a recycling back of revenues to consumers.
A drop in final demand would in turn lead to decline of production of energy-
intensive sectors in the first place and would also have indirect effects on other in-
dustries. Utilizing the demand-driven IO model, we estimate that total output would
decrease by about 1.8 % or 43 billion UAH. Figure 2 illustrates the breakdown of the
percentage decline in gross output for all sectors.
A decline of total production would lead to excess of labor per unit of output. Thus,
producers would have to fire extra workers to minimize losses. It is estimated that the
number of jobs would be reduced by 223 thousand or by 1.3 % and 0.7 % as a result
of the removal of subsidies in gas and electricity sectors, respectively. Employment
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effects for each sector are determined by labor intensity and percentage decline in
gross output. For example, service sectors (e.g., public administration, education, and
health care) are the most labor-intensive sectors with up to 27 employees per million
UAH of output in health care. However, a relatively low decline in total output would
result in only 1–2 % decline in the number of jobs. In comparison, relatively low
labor intensity in oil and gas extraction (about 4 workers per unit of output) coupled
with a major decline in production, illustrated in Fig. 2, would result in a 22 % loss
of jobs. Sectors in production and distribution of water and gas would be also highly
affected due to large cuts in production.
Overall, an energy subsidy reform is likely to have negative effects on the total
employment in the short-run. However, it is important to note that these estimates
are the indication of the upper bound of employment effects considering uncertainty
on adjustment of the production levels. Nevertheless, over a longer time horizon, the
economy would restructure toward less energy-intensive sectors and reduced employ-
ment in the shrinking sectors is likely to be compensated by expanded production and
new jobs in other industries. However, labor reallocation could not be modeled within
the chosen IO framework.
4.3 Income Effects for Different Income Groups
We examine income distribution effects for households resulting from energy pricing
policy reform in the gas and electricity sectors. The consumer price index reflects
the cost of a standard basket of goods and services required by households for an
everyday life, and hence, could be an appropriate measure for estimation of welfare
effects of energy pricing policies. The overall effect is determined by the increase of
relative prices for different economic sectors and structure of consumer expenditure
for different income groups. Figure 3 illustrates increase of CPI or percentage of
additional income required by rural and urban households for buying the same set of
goods and services. Adjusting gas and electricity prices to market levels will reduce
the real income and purchasing power by about 13.2 % for urban poor and by 11.5 %
for higher income households. Rural families are comparatively less susceptible to
an energy subsidy reform since utilities and housing related payments, which face
the highest price increase, constitute a lower share of their monthly expenditures.
In particular, urban families allocate between 7.7 % and 10.8 % of their budgets to
utility payments while rural ones only allocate 4.2–6.4 % (SSCU 2009b).
It can be noted from Fig. 3 that an energy subsidy reform is likely to be regressive
for urban but nonregressive for rural households. Interestingly, regressive effects are
concealed if urban and rural households are aggregated (see Fig. 4). Both urban and
rural families are more vulnerable to elimination of gas subsidies with Consumer
Price Index (CPI) rising by 7.7 % for urban poor and by 6.4 % for higher income
urban families. For rural households, these figures are 5.4 % and 4.6 %, respectively.
Figure 4 shows contribution of aggregate consumption categories to overall
change of CPI for different income groups (rural and urban households are aggre-
gated). Housing is largely responsible for the energy prices induced increase in the
inflation rate. It constitutes 76 % for the lowest and 70 % for the highest income
households in the cumulative CPI. Food and clothing, which also reflect basic ne-
cessities, follow a similar pattern with their CPI fractions being higher for the poor
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Fig. 3 CPI increase for different socioeconomic groups of urban and rural households. Note: socioeco-
nomic groups are ordered from lowest (1st) to highest income (11th)
Fig. 4 Increase of CPI differentiated between 9 aggregate consumption categories by socioeconomic
groups. Note: (1) socioeconomic groups are ordered from lowest (1st) to highest (11th). (2) See Additional
file 2, Table B.1. for compatibility of IO sectors with aggregate consumption categories
families and lower for higher income families. Other consumption categories, espe-
cially more luxury goods such as miscellaneous goods and restaurants and hotels
depict quite an opposite situation with CPI shares being lower for poor households
and higher for the ones with higher income.
It is important to note that estimated inflation rates represent the upper bounds of
CPI changes because consumption patterns of households would change by shifting
to comparable commodities for which prices had increased to a lesser extent, which
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in turn would reduce the CPI impact of eliminating subsidies. However, the IO model
incorporates the assumption that household consumption patterns do not change in
response to changes of relative prices of goods and services similar to constant techni-
cal coefficients (Perman et al. 2003), which is a reasonable assumption for short-time
horizons explored in this study.
It is interesting to compare an average estimated CPI for all households of 10.5 %
(see Fig. 4) resulting from a hypothetical energy subsidies reform with the actual
inflation rate at the same time, which amounted to 12.8 % and 25.2 % in 2007 and
2008, respectively (SSCU 2009a). Therefore, it should be noted that immediate re-
moval of energy subsidies and liberalization of energy prices at one step would not
be tolerable to society considering already relatively high annual inflation rates ob-
served in Ukraine. Hence, an increase of energy prices up to market levels should
be implemented in steps and accompanied by social support programs targeting the
most vulnerable households.
4.4 Effects on Energy Consumption
Elimination of energy subsidies in electricity and gas sectors is essential to decrease
the energy-intensity of the economy of Ukraine, which is presently much higher than
in developed counties (IEA 2011a). This could be explained by a number of reasons
including outdated technologies used in production processes and energy conversion
(IEA 2006b); however, cheap energy is one of the most important if not the primary
determinant. A report by IEA (1999) presents evidence that there is a strong nega-
tive correlation between electricity prices and energy consumption per unit of GDP
across 27 OECD and 22 non-OECD countries. Although other external drivers such
as climate conditions, average distances, or population density might also come into
play, such a strong inverse relationship between electricity use and prices could not
be fully explained by structural parameters.
We found that a removal of the indirect gas and electricity subsidies would lead to
a drop in total energy consumption by about 2.5 % (5 million tons of coal equivalent4)
in the short term (see Eq. (13) in Sect. 3), 68 % of this reduction was due to phasing
out subsidies in the gas sector (see Additional file 1, Table A.3 for a breakdown of
results for all sectors). Figure 5 shows the sectors that could generate the highest
energy savings. In particular, the manufacture of coke and petroleum products could
reduce energy consumption by more than 1 million tons of coal equivalent due to
relatively high energy requirements per unit of output and a considerable decline in
total production of the sector (see Fig. 5). However, in relative terms, this would mean
only a 6 % decline in overall energy consumption of the sector. Significant amounts
of energy could also be saved in the supply and distribution of gas, electricity, and
water, which have the highest average energy-intensity of about 0.5 thousand tons of
coal equivalent, followed by metallurgy, chemicals, and transportation.
It is important to note that obtained results are of indicative character and de-
pend highly upon responsiveness of consumers to price changes and flexibility in
4Coal equivalent instead of oil equivalent is usually used in Ukraine. Coal equivalent could be converted
to oil equivalent by multiplying the former by 0.7.
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Fig. 5 Energy saved (in 1000 tons of coal equivalent) as a result of elimination of subsidies in gas and
electricity sectors
production adjustments of economic sectors. Moreover, it should be noted that energy
savings are caused by demand-induced decline in total production and not because
of technological change since significant efficiency improvements are not feasible in
the short-term and, therefore, ignored in this analysis (see the Sect. 3.2.3 for more de-
tail). Over the longer-term, however, price signals could stimulate energy efficiency
improvements and development of less energy-intensive industries.
Since energy security is of big concern for Ukraine as a net-importer of gas (do-
mestic production could satisfy only about 20 % of the demand (IEA 2006b)), it is
also of interest to examine short-term effects of the subsidy reform on total gas con-
sumption. Figure 6 illustrates sectors that could bring the highest decline in gas use
(see Additional file 1, Table A.3 for a breakdown of results for all sectors). Sectors in
hot water supply and electricity production are likely to contribute 21 % and 19 % of
the total decline in gas consumption, respectively. Chemicals and plastics would also
reduce gas use considerably due to high requirement for gas inputs in production.
Overall, elimination of subsidies in the gas and electricity sectors would bring re-
ductions of about 3.6 % in total gas consumption which equals roughly 1.6 billion m3.
However, considering the long-term nature of interstate gas contracts, it is not likely
that Ukraine could reduce gas imports in the short-term. Obtained figures rather serve
as an indication of potential gas savings if energy pricing policy is improved and fi-
nal consumers are required to pay the real cost of gas and electricity. Although in the
short-term gas use would decline solely because of drop in final demand and GDP,
price stimuli are essential to trigger energy efficiency improvements, which could
bring even larger savings in the future without adverse impacts on the GDP growth.
For example, Flanagan et al. (2007) utilize a semistructural approach to examine the
role of efficiency in mitigating negative impacts of energy price shocks. Assuming
3 % of GDP for intermediate energy consumption, the authors have estimated that
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Fig. 6 Reduction in gas consumption in different economic sectors
negative impacts of a 10 % increase of the import gas price could be completely
offset by 9 % improvement in gas efficiency.
4.5 Effects on GHG Emissions
We estimate that elimination of energy subsidies in gas and electricity sectors would
result in a reduction of about 15 million tons of CO2-eq. or a 3.6 % reduction of
total GHG emissions of Ukraine. Figure 7 illustrates each sector’s share in total GHG
emissions reductions (see also Additional file 1, Table A.4 for a breakdown of results
for all sectors). Although estimated energy subsidies are of similar magnitude in both
sectors, removal of subsidies in the gas sector has a significantly larger effect on
emissions reductions.
This could be explained by the fact that estimated subsidies are much higher than
the present value added of the gas sector of about 7 billion UAH (1.3 billion USD)
compared to value added of the electricity sector of about 23 billion UAH (4.4 billion
USD). Hence, elimination of subsidies would result in higher prices for gas, which in
turn would have a larger effect on relative prices, final demand, and output of other
sectors. The largest share of emissions reductions would be observed in the oil and
gas extraction sectors due to a decline of fugitive methane emissions. Energy supply
and distribution sectors are also likely to deliver considerable emission cuts with
reductions in electricity production and hot water supply of about 10 % and 16 %,
respectively. GHG emissions from fuel combustion by households would be 15 %
lower.
It is important to note that cross-substitution between different fuels is not consid-
ered in this paper. It is a major limitation for evaluation of impacts on GHG emissions
since higher prices for one type of fuel could stimulate end-users to substitute for
cheaper ones in the long run. Subsidies for coal are beyond the scope of this paper;
however, coal is the most carbon-intensive fuel. If end-user subsidies are eliminated
only in gas and electricity sectors and coal prices remain at below market levels (due
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Fig. 7 Emission reductions (in 1000 tons CO2-eq.) in each sector as a result of elimination of gas and
electricity subsidies
to producer subsidies), both end-users and intermediate consumers, e.g., power plants
are likely to switch to coal as less expensive energy source as much as technological
capacity would allow. In this case, liberalization of gas and electricity prices would
likely result in larger coal use and higher GHG emissions. Hence, energy subsidy
reform should consider all fuels to prevent undesirable effects. Moreover, depend-
ing on the resultant market price of different fuels an additional measure might be
required to prevent substitution for coal, e.g., carbon tax charged depending on the
carbon-intensity of the output.
5 Conclusions
This paper has adopted the price-gap approach for estimation of indirect end-user
subsidies in gas and electricity sectors in Ukraine and considered a hypothetical elim-
ination of energy subsidies. Although a minor decline in GDP is expected, this is the
short-term price to be paid to correct market distortions that had been accumulated
over decades of inefficient energy pricing. Other benefits of the removal of subsi-
dies would include a reduction in total energy consumption and GHG emissions,
which would drop by about 2.5 % and 3.6 %, respectively. In addition, these short-
term demand-induced effects would potentially trigger dynamic effects of accelerated
technological improvements over the long term.
Energy subsidy reform is likely to have negative employment effects due to steep
production cuts in resource-intensive sectors. However, a short-term loss of jobs
could be minimized if the government would create favorable conditions for the es-
tablishment of new working places in other sectors. Removal of subsidies is also
likely to be regressive with lower income groups, who spend a larger share of their
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income on fuels, to be affected more than richer households. However, this effect
could be mitigated by social policies targeting the most vulnerable.
It is important to note that complete and immediate elimination of subsidies is con-
sidered here as a theoretical exercise and is done to provide an estimate of potential
losses and negative social effects. A gradual phase-out is more advisable to mitigate
negative effects. In addition, end-user subsidies reform in gas and electricity sectors
is not sufficient to correct all price distortions. Producer subsidies in the coal sector
should be also eliminated to stimulate technological change toward a less carbon-
intensive economy and to avoid switching to cheaper coal. Moreover, obtained results
are of an indicative character due to data caveats and other shortcomings of the meth-
ods applied, and only illustrate the magnitude of the likely effects of subsidy reform
in the short-run. Nevertheless, even rough quantitative estimates could be useful for
decision-makers since they provide valuable insights for the planning of energy and
climate policy of Ukraine.
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